Adapting Laws For A Changing World: A Systemic Approach To Climate Change Adaptation by Flatt, Victor B.
Florida Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 1 Article 6
10-17-2012
Adapting Laws For A Changing World: A Systemic
Approach To Climate Change Adaptation
Victor B. Flatt
flatt@email.unc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an
authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation




ADAPTING LAWS FOR A CHANGING WORLD:  
A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
Victor B. Flatt∗ 
Abstract 
This Essay suggests that policy responses in climate change 
adaptation must be addressed and that focusing on adapting laws may 
be a good way to undertake this work. Following a review of existing 
scholarship and normative theories concerning law generally, 
environmental law, climate change, and adaptation, this Essay then 
proposes a template for approaching the adaptation of laws. This 
template would (1) examine where climate change puts pressure on the 
operation of laws; (2) seek to alter the implementation of that law or to 
alter the law itself to hew closely to the law’s original purposes; and (3) 
make these alterations in the most efficient manner possible while also 
correcting any distributive reallocations. Where the law’s original 
purposes cannot be accommodated or are so broad as to fail to 
constitute a clear legislative principle, policy changes should be made in 
the democratic forum, not by an administrative process. The Essay 
concludes with examples from working groups implementing the 
template approach. 
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“All climate-sensitive systems of society and the natural 
environment . . . will need to adapt to a changing climate or possibly 
face diminished productivity, functioning and health.”1 
 –Environmental Protection Agency 
INTRODUCTION 
Discussion of climate change has long focused on “mitigation”—
what can be done to reduce the sources of, or increase the sinks for, 
greenhouse gases.2 Proposals to limit carbon dioxide emissions from 
power plants, to switch to renewable sources of energy, or to increase 
fuel efficiency in cars all address mitigation. The ultimate goal of these 
proposals is to reduce greenhouse gases and thereby prevent the effects 
of these gases on the climate. 
More recently, however, the discussion has shifted to “adaptation,” 
which is defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) as “the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to 
actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects.”3 Underlying 
adaptation efforts is the understanding that certain climate change 
impacts will inevitably occur.4 The goal then becomes to lessen the 
                                                                                                                     
 1.  Climate Change—Health and Environmental Effects: Adaptation, EPA.GOV, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/adaptation.html (last updated June 2, 2011). 
 2. See H-Holger Rogner et al., Introduction to INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION 102–09 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
IPCC, MITIGATION], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-
chapter1.pdf (detailing mitigation efforts to date). 
 3. Introduction to INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 6 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
IPCC, IMPACTS], available at http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/AR4/website/intro.pdf. 
 4. See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five 
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 23 (2010); Daniel 
A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 879–80 
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magnitude of these impacts on humans and the natural environment.5 As 
the IPCC stated, “[M]itigation will always be required to avoid 
‘dangerous’ and irreversible changes to the climate system. Irrespective 
of the scale of the mitigation measures that are implemented in the next 
10–20 years, adaptation measures will still be required due to the inertia 
in the climate system.”6 
The challenge of climate change adaptation is exceptional and even 
broader than the challenge of mitigation. Scientifically and technically, 
the impacts of climate change are uncertain, particularly when 
downscaled to the regional or local level.7 Better understanding will 
require more funding to improve our analysis and evaluation.8 Once the 
scientific community better understands these impacts, responses may 
also require funds to lessen the harm that these impacts may have on the 
natural systems on which humans depend.9 Thus, the funding of 
adaptation science has been one of the central foci of discourse on the 
issue and has occupied a large part of international climate change 
dialogue, such as at the Copenhagen meeting in December 2009.10 
The last few years have also seen activity in climate change 
adaptation regarding the role of policy in lessening the impacts of 
climate change. For instance, the federal government created the 
Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, which has 
published a proposal for how federal agencies can better prepare for 
climate change impacts.11 Some states and localities have also 
                                                                                                                     
(2008). 
 5. See WILLIAM E. EASTERLING III ET AL., COPING WITH GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: THE 
ROLE OF ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2004), available at http://www.pewclimate. 
org/docUploads/Adaptation.pdf; Climate Change—Health and Environmental Effects: 
Adaptation, supra note 1 (“[M]uch of adaptation may be planned and undertaken by private 
decision makers and by public agencies or governments.”). 
 6. IPCC, MITIGATION, supra note 2, at 101. 
 7. Lindsay F. Wiley, Healthy Planet, Healthy People: Integrating Global Health into the 
International Response to Climate Change, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 203, 235 (2009). 
 8. See Orr Karassin, Mind the Gap: Knowledge and Need in Regulating Adaptation to 
Climate Change, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 383, 385–88 (2010) (discussing how the 
attention given to adaptation “has primarily focused on funding adaptation in developing 
countries”). 
 9. Id. at 423–27 (discussing the funding necessary to cover the costs associated with 
planned adaptation). 
 10. See id. at 385–86; Daniel H. Cole, Climate Change, Adaptation, and Development, 26 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2008) (discussing the international impact of the costs of 
climate change). 
 11. See Council on Envtl. Quality, Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, WHITE 
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2011) (“On October 14, 2010, the Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, co-chaired 
by the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), released its interagency report outlining recommendations to President Obama for 
3
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undertaken to plan for climate change.12 
Many of these initiatives grapple with the proper response of law 
and policy to impacts on natural resources and ecosystems.13 The idea is 
that policy tools, such as laws and regulations, can lessen the harms of 
climate impacts to the natural ecosystem. But unlike the push for more 
funding to discover and respond to climate alterations, the policy 
changes necessary to deal with natural resource preservation are not as 
clear-cut, and in any event, are also beholden to the fact that climate 
models cannot always predict specific impacts on smaller scales.14 
Institutionally, there is fragmented authority to manage natural 
resources.15 For example, a policy response to water availability 
changes may be difficult to accomplish because water resources 
management can be controlled by multiple federal agencies, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency,16 the Fish and Wildlife Service,17 
and the Army Corps of Engineers,18 as well as state and local 
governments.19 Thus, there are questions concerning the proper agency 
and level of government to act.20 These possible policy responses to 
climate change from multiple agencies and multiple levels may work at 
cross-purposes, leaving less efficient adaptation or an even worse 
situation.21 
                                                                                                                     
how Federal Agency policies and programs can better prepare the United States to respond to 
the impacts of climate change.”). 
 12. Karassin, supra note 8, at 387 (“[T]enstates [sic] managed by the end of 2009 to 
complete or be in the process of devising an adaptation plan.”). 
 13. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE 
INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN 
SUPPORT OF A NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGY 18–19 (2010), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/Interagency-Climate-Change-
Adaptation-Progress-Report.pdf (discussing the federal government’s role in climate change 
adaptation). 
 14. See Wiley, supra note 7, at 235 (noting the vast spectrum of adaptation strategies). 
 15. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 26–27 (2009). 
 16. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 661–66c (2006). 
 18. See, e.g., Water Supply Act of 1958, 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2006). 
 19. See, e.g., N.C. Dep’t of Env’t and Natural Res., Division of Water Resources: Water 
Supply Planning Branch, NCWATER.ORG, http://www.ncwater.org/About_DWR/Water_Supply 
_Planning_Section (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (“The Water Supply Planning Branch is 
responsible for Local Water Supply Plans, the State Water Supply Plan, the Registration of 
Water Withdrawals and Transfers, and providing technical assistance to public water supply 
system operators and their consultants. Services include analysis of existing water supply 
systems, recommendations on new sources of water supply, coordination of regional 
cooperation between local water supply systems, and evaluation of future water demands.”). 
 20. Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective on 
Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1164–65 (2010). 
 21. Id. at 1164 (noting the need for adaptation to come from all societal sectors); see also 
4
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As difficult as policy responses to changes in the natural 
environment can be, they are only the tip of the adaptation iceberg. Any 
changes in the natural environment call into question the societal and 
institutional agreements that are based in part on—or in—the natural 
environment. Thus, natural environment changes represent a potentially 
bigger challenge than first appears, as they may ripple through most of 
human society. Indeed, the IPCC specifically states that when we 
consider climate change adaptation, we should be looking at the change 
in “human systems” in addition to natural systems.22 Unless we can 
essentially replicate or replace current natural systems exactly, coping 
with impacts in the natural world alone will be insufficient for humans 
to adapt to climate change.23 
Commentators have proposed numerous solutions to this challenge. 
In her article on climate change adaptation, Professor Orr Karassin 
notes that it is possible that the private sector will respond to climate 
change without any government intervention.24 To the extent that 
changes wrought by the climate create economic opportunities and 
costs, the opportunity to maximize individual benefits incentivizes 
responses.25 Uncertainties regarding climate change impacts may also 
counsel against government intervention in adaptation because actions 
could be wrong or superfluous.26 However, Professor Karassin 
concludes by noting that these very uncertainties call for government 
regulation in order to assure some predictability for private markets and 
investment.27 
Several scholars have focused on government policy response in 
describing adaptation in resources and the environment, noting that the 
legal frameworks could be improved by resiliency or flexibility, or by 
the adoption of “adaptive management.”28 Others have proposed 
specific legal interpretations of existing laws to facilitate adapting the 
                                                                                                                     
Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1099–115 (2011) (identifying the challenges of “multilevel, multiactor” 
governance). 
 22. See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 3, at 361. 
 23. See id. at 373–74. 
 24. Karassin, supra note 8, at 390. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 390–91. 
 27. Id. at 391. 
 28. See, e.g., W. Neil Adger et al., Successful Adaptation to Climate Change Across 
Scales, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 77, 81 (2005) (recognizing flexibility or the “ability to 
change in response to altered circumstances” as a key indicator of “the effectiveness of an 
adaptation action”); Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1162–63 (describing climate change 
adaptation in terms of increasing the resiliency “of natural and human ecosystems to the threats 
posed by a changing environment”); Daniel Schramm & Akiva Fishman, Legal Frameworks for 
Adaptive Natural Resource Management in a Changing Climate, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
491, 496–97 (2010) (discussing “adaptive management”). 
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natural environment.29 Some scholars have attempted to look at climate 
change adaptation more broadly in regulation or in legal systems as a 
whole.30 For instance, Professor Alejandro Camacho has suggested that 
examining adaptation in the context of resources suggests that the 
reality of climate change should alter the way regulatory agencies 
work.31 In addition, the Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation and 
Resources (CLEAR) at the University of North Carolina School of Law 
has held workshops generally examining the issue of adapting legal 
systems in the face of climate change.32 
It is time to tie these strands together in an overarching way—to 
discuss adapting to a changing world through all areas of law. Climate 
change will critically affect natural resources and the environment, and 
because both provide the basis for other types of relations and 
interactions, it follows that climate change will in turn affect contracts, 
property law, patent law, health law, insurance law, and banking law, to 
name a few areas.33 
Is there a common way to examine changing circumstances or 
possibilities of changes and propose legal alterations in all areas? I 
believe there can be. In this Essay, I will propose a protocol for adapting 
laws generally, given the changing climate of our world, and will 
provide normative support for this particular protocol. Given the current 
legal framework that envisions laws working together and usually not at 
cross-purposes, using the legal system itself as a way to examine 
adaptive responses may also resolve issues associated with 
implementing policy solutions in a vacuum. 
Part I of this Essay reviews the issue of climate change adaptation 
and specifically argues that a broad-based focus on adapting laws could 
provide a systemic way of addressing climate change impacts on 
multiple, diverse parts of society. Part II focuses on the existing 
adaptation scholarship and examines scholars who have attempted to 
think about adaptation in more than one context or from the normative 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building 
Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008). 
 30. See Karassin, supra note 8, at 388. 
 31. Camacho, supra note 15, at 19–22. 
 32. See Ctr. for Law, Env’t, Adaptation & Res., Adapting Legal Regimes in the Face of 
Climate Change, UNC SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.unc.edu/centers/clear/workshops/clim 
atechange/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (describing a workshop hosted by the 
University of North Carolina School of Law’s Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation and 
Resources (CLEAR) in October 2008). 
 33. See id. (listing relevant legal fields, including “environmental . . . climate change, 
disaster, public health, IP, and property”). See generally Ira R. Feldman & Joshua H. Kahan, 
Preparing for the Day After Tomorrow: Frameworks for Climate Change Adaptation, 
8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 61, 63–64 (2007) (analyzing how numerous strata of law are 
affected by climate change). 
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bases underlying adaptation choices. Part III reviews some current 
proposals for adaptation templates and then proposes a specific legal 
adaptation protocol as an appropriate tool because it is supported by, 
and based on, important normative principles. Part IV then applies the 
protocol using examples. 
I.  THE ADAPTATION OF LAW IS A LOGICAL LENS THROUGH WHICH TO 
VIEW CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION GENERALLY 
Law is the system of rules or standards that governs private and 
public actors.34 Within the United States, law so suffuses our lives that 
it is easy to forget that law can be seen as part of a common construct. 
While undoubtedly, certain parts of law seem more important to certain 
persons, societal segments, or businesses, it is generally impossible to 
completely isolate one area of law from an overarching legal structure. 
The very name “common law” suggests the interrelationship of laws 
that have evolved over time, and the law understands itself as rational 
and systematic.35 Indeed, every American law student learns the trifecta 
of contracts, property, and torts, even if their interrelationship often 
inexplicably goes unacknowledged.36 Under the classical theory of 
common law, the courts apply “a complete, coherent, and formal body 
of law, police the boundaries of legislative authority and define the 
ground rules for interaction among private individuals” through 
“contract[s], tort[s] and property.”37 
While progressives have criticized and substantially altered this 
traditional approach to law,38 it is still foundational with respect to legal 
systems. New statutes should be narrowly read in the context of existing 
ones and the common law.39 Though there are often complaints about 
the silo nature of certain areas of the law, which comes from focusing 
on one particular issue at a time, the law is like an organism that must 
                                                                                                                     
 34. In this definition, “law” does not include actions of the government as market agent, 
such as a purchaser, though these can also affect the actions of the private sector. 
 35. See James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished 
Business, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1815, 1819 (2000) (describing the search for a “rational and 
systematic explanation” of the common law). 
 36. See Office of Career Services: The New 1L Curriculum, HARV. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/careers/ocs/employers/about-our-students/the-new-1l-curr 
iculum.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (noting that the traditional law school curriculum 
requires first-year law students to take torts, property, and contracts). 
 37. Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004). 
 38. See id. at 8 (recognizing the critiques raised by “pragmatists, Progressives, 
sociological jurisprudents, and legal realists”). 
 39. See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) 
(“The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change 
the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.”). 
7
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evolve from prior organisms. Changes in focus are added onto and 
integrated with what already exists. This evolutionary adaptation 
protects against accidental loss of prior useful tools. While this theory 
does not refute the need for wholesale change at times, it reflects a 
tradition in American legal thought described by Professor Bruce 
Ackerman as “[e]volution, not revolution; slow and unconscious 
adaptation, not self-conscious institutional engineering.”40 
The importance of “what comes before” is also seen in some of the 
economic underpinnings of the relationship between statutory 
intervention and the common law. Statutory intervention in the common 
law is often, if not usually, justified by claiming market failures that do 
not allow the common law trifecta to work properly.41 Thus, 
environmental regulation that directly controls emissions may be 
justified by the notion that the operation of the common law cannot 
internalize market externalities leading to inefficient allocation of 
resources, or just as importantly, cannot respect individual entitlements 
free of interference at common law.42 This primacy of a uniform 
common law is even seen in constitutional jurisprudence, where the 
right to individual protection has been described as a property interest 
that legislation cannot alter.43 
Our legal systems also operate at multiple levels, which themselves 
require integration. Much of the U.S. Constitution is given over to the 
concept of federalism and the relationship between sovereigns.44 Levels 
of jurisdiction are particularly important with respect to climate change 
adaptation, which has effects at many different levels of governance. As 
                                                                                                                     
 40. Bruce Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1991). 
 41. See Feinman, supra note 37, at 13–14. Though he disagrees, Professor Cass R. 
Sunstein posits that most legal scholars believe that the common law is the “neutral” 
background on which intervention can be made. Robert Justin Lipkin, The Quest for the 
Common Good: Neutrality and Deliberative Democracy in Sunstein’s Conception of American 
Constitutionalism, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 (1994). 
 42. Victor B. Flatt, “[H]e Should at His Peril Keep It There . . .”: How the Common Law 
Tells Us that Risk Based Corrective Action Is Wrong, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 359 (2001). 
 43. See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 29 (1823) (“The framers of our constitutions, by 
the prohibitions against impairing the obligations of contracts, intended to protect all rights 
dependent upon contract from being diminished or destroyed; and they could not certainly have 
intended to leave injuries to property . . . wholly unredressed . . . .”); cf. Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978) (highlighting a need for congressional 
intervention in the free market where the common law poses a disincentive to private industry 
participation). 
 44. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (“Dual 
sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation’s constitutional blueprint.”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“[O]ur Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between 
the States and the Federal Government. . . . ‘[U]nder our federal system, the States possess 
sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed 
by the Supremacy Clause.’” (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990))). 
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Professor J.B. Ruhl notes, “Adaptation . . . is about many different 
effects, varied across the nation, operating at many different and 
sometimes competing scales.”45 Because it is unclear which level of 
government is best suited for adaptive response—and choosing the 
wrong one may be counterproductive or politically difficult46—a 
response that moves through a system that is already integrated with 
respective roles, at least in the first instance, should prove more 
appropriate than random tinkering. 
We thus begin with the propositions that our interactions and 
societies are governed by laws and that these laws operate within a 
complex web of interrelationships. In such a web, efforts to correct or 
alter societal problems must operate through law and must complement 
the system within which the law resides. This suggests that the legal 
system itself is a good vantage point from which to view the challenges 
that climate change will bring and perhaps is the primary tool to adapt 
to those changes. But if we are to use law in this manner, how should 
we do so? In what ways should we change or alter laws or policies to 
optimally adapt without causing unintended consequences? 
II.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND LEGAL ADAPTATION 
Most scholars examining climate change adaptation and the law 
have focused primarily on the natural resources arena, though some 
have taken a broader view. Within this context, attention has focused on 
two major axes: the “system” to use when thinking about adaptation and 
the “scale” (governance level) at which adaptation should occur. 
A.  Systems 
With respect to systems of legal adaptation to climate change, much 
has been written about the systemic introduction of resiliency in the 
law.47 Resiliency focuses primarily on the way in which climate change 
may accelerate the rate of change of physical or natural systems and 
suggests that one way climate change should be dealt with is to replace 
the idea of a static environment with one that is changing or dynamic.48 
                                                                                                                     
 45. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of 
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 426 (2010). 
 46. Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1173. 
 47. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 15, at 39; Ruhl, supra note 45, at 386 (describing this 
strategy and noting the benefits of “enhancing resilience to impacts, such as through improved 
emergency response techniques and habitat restoration methods”); J.B. Ruhl, General Design 
Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—With Applications to 
Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1379–85 (2011) [hereinafter Ruhl, Design 
Principles] (discussing resilient legal systems); Schramm & Fishman, supra note 28, at 492 
(discussing the need for “resilient and robust decision-making frameworks that can nimbly 
respond to new information and changes in ecological conditions”). 
 48. See Camacho, supra note 15, at 13–14 (describing the uncertainty associated with 
9
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Previously, ecologists had recognized that systems undergo periodic 
shocks, but the assumption was “that natural systems fluctuate within an 
unchanging envelope of variability”—an idea known as “stationarity.”49 
However, as Professor J.B. Ruhl notes, “[T]he stationarity premise is on 
thin ice in the era of climate change. Ecologists now warn of the no-
analog future—ecological variability unprecedented in the history of 
ecology, riddled with nonlinear feedback and feed-forward loops, 
previously unknown emergent properties, and new thresholds of 
irreversible change.”50 Consequently, it may be difficult to specifically 
program law to accomplish goals, so all laws should be more flexible 
and thus more responsive to the rapid dynamism which will occur.51 
Scholars have thus argued that “[l]egal structures that promote tactical 
flexibility while keeping managers focused on achieving long-term 
sustainability objectives will be crucial to preserving biodiversity and 
ecosystem services well into an uncertain future.”52 
Along with resiliency, legal systems adaptation writing has focused 
on the use of adaptive management—a tool of environmental law—as a 
legal framework for addressing fast-changing, climate-altered facts on 
the ground. 
Adaptive management takes a holistic, ecosystem-level 
approach to environmental issues . . . . At its core it 
“involves synthesizing existing knowledge, exploring 
alternative actions, making explicit predictions of their 
outcomes, selecting one or more actions to implement, 
monitoring to determine whether outcomes match those 
predicted, and using these results to adjust future plans.”53 
                                                                                                                     
climate change adaptation); Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and Creativity: The New 
Ecology and Some Old Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 51 (1996) (“[E]cological 
systems are dynamic, changing systems.”); Ruhl, Design Principles, supra note 47, at 1379 
(describing the “resilient” legal system); Schramm & Fishman, supra note 28, at 493–95 
(illustrating the predicted effects of climate change on our global environment). 
 49. See Ruhl, Design Principles, supra note 47, at 1394 (quoting P.C.D. Milly et al., 
Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573, 573 (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Camacho, supra note 15, at 39 (“[V]arious legal scholars have asserted the 
importance of cultivating programs that allow for flexibility and learning in agency decisions. 
These assertions have paralleled the mounting appeals in the scientific literature to integrate 
adaptive management in resource regulation.”); Ruhl, supra note 45, at 423 (calling for 
“[g]reater [v]ariety and [f]lexibility in [r]egulatory [i]nstruments”); Ruhl, Design Principles, 
supra note 47, at 1379–85 (describing the resilient legal system); Schramm & Fishman, supra 
note 28, at 496–97 (arguing for a more resilient and flexible legal structure and articulating 
specific problems with our existing rigid framework). 
 52. Schramm & Fishman, supra note 28, at 492. 
 53. See id. at 498 (quoting Carol Murray & David Marmorck, Adaptive Management and 
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Like resiliency, adaptive management anticipates flexibility in legal 
response, but introduces it at an iterative administrative level, rather 
than solely in the original legislative process. Professor Camacho, in 
particular, has suggested that adaptive management can be applied to 
government regulation itself.54 He argues that “[b]y incorporating an 
adaptive-learning framework into the regulatory process itself, 
regulatory agencies[,] . . . charged with administering complex, 
unproven laws, can finally begin to help make regulation evolve.”55 The 
use of adaptive management as a tool has many critics who complain 
that its proponents often use it as a screen to cover information gaps56 or 
to “conceal political accommodations.”57 Notwithstanding these critics, 
adaptive management’s iterative nature—which purports to finetune 
new decisions with new information—can accommodate a situation in 
which information is unclear, yet it still seems prudent to begin with 
management of some sort. Future climate change impacts exemplify 
such a situation. 
B.  Scale 
Another strand of climate change adaptation of law has focused on 
which levels of government and law are best suited to address climate 
change impacts.58 Professor Robert Glicksman has noted that the failure 
                                                                                                                     
Ecological Restoration, in ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION OF SOUTHWESTERN PONDEROSA PINE 
FORESTS 417–18 (Peter Friederici ed., 2003)); see also Camacho, supra note 15, at 23 (“This 
increasingly influential model seeks to address information gaps in management plans that 
surface during plan formation by including systematic monitoring procedures for obtaining 
more data to adjust the management strategies during implementation.”). 
 54. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive 
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 358 (2007). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2007); see also Camacho, supra note 15, at 42 (“Some have even observed that 
certain agencies have sought to use the adaptive management label as a screen for approving 
action when they are faced with uncertain effects but have little interest in subsequent 
monitoring and adaptation.”); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information 
Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1466–68 (2011) (discussing the failures of adaptive 
management when opportunities for learning to fill information gaps are not present). 
 57. See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the 
Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 88 
(2001) (“Adaptive management can be used as a smokescreen to conceal political 
accommodations that sacrifice the protection of species or natural systems.”). 
 58. See Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1165 (providing “a framework for determining how 
to structure a policy to facilitate adaptation to climate change that assigns appropriate roles to all 
levels of government”). See generally RONALD D. BRUNNER & AMANDA H. LYNCH, ADAPTIVE 
GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE ix (2010) (concluding that “adaptive governance is an 
emerging pattern of science, policy, and decision making, and so far a missed opportunity for 
reducing net losses from climate change on larger scales at all levels in the international system, 
from local to global”). 
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to consider this issue might result in counterproductive actions or in 
different levels of government acting at cross-purposes.59 
Scholars who have taken positions on the governance issue have 
generally noted that there should be more adaptation governance at the 
local level.60 Local focus on adaptation allows the government to tailor 
its response to specific harms that are occurring. As Professor 
Glicksman has observed, “[E]ffective adaptation policy may depend on 
knowledge of and the ability to respond to diverse local conditions. 
State and local policymakers may be able to make the necessary 
adjustments more effectively than the federal government can.”61 Local 
policy also has the benefit of being more responsive to the wants and 
needs of constituents and is thus more democratic.62 According to 
Professors Robert D. Brunner and Amanda H. Lynch, in the absence of 
clear outcomes, participation in decisionmaking is particularly 
important63: 
[S]tate and local adaptation efforts will [also] be crucial 
because many of the likely impacts of a changing climate 
will affect matters where state and local government 
already play an important role, including the construction 
and protection of urban infrastructure, regulation of land 
use, enforcement of building codes, and, certainly not least, 
natural disaster response.64 
Lastly, because of its relation to local effects, the political will to 
take action is likely to be present.65 Indeed, despite the fact that political 
will for comprehensive federal climate change legislation has been 
difficult to build and maintain, “the political will and other resources 
necessary to address adaptation . . . already exist in niches here and 
there. These niches can be expected to grow as the adverse impacts of 
climate change become more obvious in more communities.”66 A 
survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors released in June 2011 shows 
that 31% of cities already incorporate climate change adaptation into 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1183. 
 60. See BRUNNER & LYNCH, supra note 58, at 235; Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1172; see 
also Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental 
Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 133–38 (2012) (advocating for and describing “local climate action 
groups” and the importance of fostering local efforts to adapt to climate change). 
 61. Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1172. 
 62. See BRUNNER & LYNCH, supra note 58, at 245–46. 
 63. Id. at 244–46. 
 64. WINSTON HARRINGTON, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, ISSUE BRIEF 10–17, PROMOTING 
INNOVATIVE CLIMATE ADAPTATION THROUGH FEDERALISM 1, 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-IB-10-17.pdf. 
 65. See BRUNNER & LYNCH, supra note 58, at 103. 
 66. Id. 
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their fiscal planning.67 
These rationales for localism echo the general experience with 
environmental law. In her recent article on the “intrusiveness” of 
environmental laws, Professor Katrina Kuh notes how much more a 
local populace will accommodate seemingly intrusive laws, presumably 
because of the closer nature of governance.68 
There are recognized drawbacks to this approach—most importantly, 
the issue of transboundary effects and the lack of resources that may be 
necessary to undertake the changes in regulation and physical structure 
required to deal with climate-induced changes. Professor Glicksman has 
noted this difficulty and proposed a cooperative federalism approach to 
climate change adaptation in which the federal government provides 
grants and resources to state and local governments empowered to 
decide how best to allocate the resources.69 This scale-conscious 
approach would promote cooperation and efficiency amongst various 
levels of government.  
III.  APPROACHES TO LEGAL ADAPTATION IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
A.  Do Axes of Climate Change Adaptation Analysis Suggest a 
Template for Systematically Approaching Climate Change Adaptation? 
The systemic and scalar discussions of addressing climate change 
adaptation in law both recognize that existing legal systems, whether 
they address natural resource protection or some other area, are highly 
complex.70 Regardless of its origin—perhaps because there are multiple 
levels of regulation, perhaps because the systems inevitably are 
perturbed by new information—we start with the premise that 
complexity is one of the most important realities of legal and regulatory 
approaches to policy. 
Both of these axes of analysis, as well as general scholarship of 
climate change adaptation, further note that the changes wrought by the 
speed of climatic disruption add a new level of complexity and 
challenge to current legal systems that these systems were not designed 
                                                                                                                     
 67. John McArdle, 31% of U.S. Mayors Weigh Adaptation in Project Planning—Survey, 
E&E NEWS PM (June 17, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2011/06/17/archive/4?terms 
=31%25+of+us+mayors. 
 68. See Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual 
Behaviors that Harm the Environment, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 18–19), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1760453. 
 69. Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1172, 1192–93. 
 70. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources 
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1436–37 (2011); Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1164 
(observing that fixing the significant gaps in the U.S. approach to climate change adaptation 
requires a complex organization and coordination of “federal, state, local, and tribal actors”). 
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to address. This observation has spurred some of these scholars to 
suggest specific practical methods of approaching legal adaptation. 
1.  Scale 
As discussed in Section II.B, with respect to issues of scale, more 
than one scholar has emphasized the importance of climate change 
adaptation at the local level.71 In many cases, localism is proposed as an 
antidote to the perceived ineffectiveness of top-down regulation and 
what some describe as a lack of political will. It is also relevant in the 
context of the necessity of adaptation tools, such as land use and 
building codes, which are local in nature. 
Professor Glicksman assumes that responses to climate change must 
occur at all levels of governance72 and suggests how a division between 
levels of government should be realized. In effect, he suggests that 
different adaptation policies should rest with the level of government 
least subject to collective action problems.73 Essentially, states and 
localities should take the lead on adaptation when they address the 
problem without detrimentally affecting others, but a federal response is 
appropriate to avoid transboundary problems or if a state fails to act. In 
many ways, Professor Glicksman’s approach echoes the Founders’ 
approach to federalism, which suggested government at the most direct 
level possible.74 It follows that when direct governance is not possible 
due to market failures or inaction, a higher level of government should 
engage.75 
Thus, this analysis of scale is consistent with the idea that an 
adaptation framework should be hung on our current legal scaffolding, 
as issues of multiple levels of governance with adaptation are similar to 
what has constructed our current federalism jurisprudence. 
2.  Systems 
Much of the systems’ focus on legal adaptation centers on 
dynamism. Professor Ruhl’s discussion of the “no analog” future 
suggests a reexamination of existing goals in natural resources policy to 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See BRUNNER & LYNCH, supra note 58, at 235–36, 242–43, 246; Elizabeth C. Black, 
Climate Change Adaptation: Local Solutions for a Global Problem, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 359, 360 (2010) (“Unlike mitigation, adaptation efforts largely involve local decision-
making, making it difficult to ensure that those responsible for creating the problem also play a 
role in solving it.”).  
 72. See Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1192. 
 73. See id. at 1193. 
 74. See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on 
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 585, 588 (2008). 
 75. See id. at 585–88 (discussing federal–state relations and how federal law “trumps” 
conflicting state law under the preemption doctrine). 
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determine what can be accomplished using current knowledge about the 
changing climate.76 For instance, the approach to managing endangered 
species may need to be radically rethought, as it may not be possible to 
preserve them pursuant to our current plan.77 This approach suggests 
that existing policies may need to be reexamined through the lens of 
practicality, in effect suggesting a triage of existing goals—at least in 
the natural resource area—to see which ones are still feasible.78 Beyond 
triaging, the systems approach suggests that there may come a point for 
rethinking goals entirely, though Professor Ruhl does not elaborate on 
how this will occur.79 
Professor Holly Doremus notes, with respect to environmental law, 
that society has created laws that are quite rigid because this 
“precommitment” to the natural world is a necessary antidote to the 
short-term economic pressures that also exist in our society.80 However, 
this need for important normative goals conflicts with the reality of 
climate change.81 For instance, Professor Doremus has noted that in the 
context of natural systems, having a fixed goal may mean giving up a 
central tenet of restoring the environment to some historic or natural 
state.82 She has posited that a combination of moving baselines—
recognizing nature’s changes—with nature preserves that can evolve 
with little human interference may be one way to avoid the pressure on 
environmental goals while still preserving flexibility.83 
The calls to apply more adaptive management to resource laws, as 
suggested by Daniel Schramm and Akiva Fishman of the Environmental 
Law Institute (ELI), are consistent with Professor Doremus’s theory, in 
that the calls recognize that the world is no longer static and that 
resource agencies must plan for this dynamism by focusing on the 
problems, goals, and objectives, rather than on the rote process.84 While 
Schramm and Fishman do not explicitly call for a revisitation of goals, 
they suggest it as one possibility in their discussion of legal mandates 
for periodic review and adjustment, in which regular review of resource 
management policies allows needed adjustment in light of changing 
                                                                                                                     
 76. See Ruhl, Design Principles, supra note 47, at 1394–95. 
 77. Ruhl, supra note 29, at 6–7. 
 78. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 45, at 388 (noting that one practical response to climate 
change is moving from the affected area). 
 79. Id. at 400. 
 80. Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law that Bends Without Breaking, 
2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45, 49, 50, 53–54 (2010). 
 81. Id. at 59. 
 82. Id. at 46. 
 83. Id. at 75–76. 
 84. See Schramm & Fishman, supra note 28, at 491–92 (“The principles of adaptive 
management provide a strong conceptual basis for evaluating and strengthening legal 
frameworks for climate change.”). 
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circumstances and insights.85 
Professor Camacho’s application of lessons from adaptive 
management to regulation itself suggests that legal adaptation can occur 
in the regulation of existing law. If regulators currently understand that 
laws apply to a static system, then a change in that understanding should 
prompt better decisionmaking.86 By recognizing that regulation should 
be adaptive, agencies can change procedures to adjust how and when 
decisions are made, as well as to better recognize uncertainties that the 
agency will need to revisit.87 This does not explicitly call for a 
reexamination of goals, but rather a new flexibility in regulation which 
would allow for more iterative decisionmaking, presumably with 
reference to goals. 
In putting forward this possibility, Professor Camacho suggests 
specific alterations that should be considered, including information-
sharing between agencies, perhaps through the development of 
clearinghouses, and revisiting prior decisions to finetune 
implementation.88 In its approach to adaptive resource management in 
developing countries, the ELI suggests a similar strategy and adds the 
idea of sun-setting laws to force lawmakers to revisit the usefulness of 
their decisions in the face of changed circumstances.89 
There are recognized drawbacks to these proposals to increase 
dynamism in the law. Professor Doremus notes the difficulty of 
countering short-term opportunism in the face of dynamism.90 Professor 
Camacho observes that agencies are already underfunded and that the 
information-sharing necessary for his proposal would require better 
funding.91 In its proposal for increasing the flexibility of 
decisionmaking, the ELI recognizes that increasing flexibility can also 
introduce a lack of decisionmaker accountability.92 Thus, it wisely goes 
on to suggest that stakeholders (the public itself) must be engaged 
enough to make decisions as to where the authority for flexibility and 
changes lie—essentially dividing the big-picture policy decisions from 
mere decisions of implementation.93 
A comprehensive look at these current systems approaches to legal 
adaptation demonstrates an important commonality. In addressing the 
                                                                                                                     
 85. See id. at 501–03. 
 86. See Camacho, supra note 15, at 38–39. 
 87. See id. at 39–40. 
 88. Id. at 49. 
 89. See ENVTL. LAW INST., LEGAL AND POLICY TOOLS TO ADAPT BIODIVERSITY 
MANAGEMENT TO CLIMATE CHANGE: RESOURCE MANUAL 57–60 (2011), available at 
http://www.elistore.org/Data/products/d21-04.pdf. 
 90. Doremus, supra note 80, at 48, 50–51. 
 91. Camacho, supra note 15, at 74. 
 92. ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 89, at 11–12. 
 93. Id. at 25–26, 28, 30. 
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need for more resiliency—or in Professor Doremus’ case, the need for 
goal flexibility—and greater speed of response, all note the importance 
of considering the original policy goals to anchor dynamism, an anchor 
which provides accountability94 to affected stakeholders, who 
presumably depend on the deliberative nature of the policymaking in 
appropriate legislative bodies. 
B.  Existing Templates for Adapting Laws in the Face of Climate 
Change 
While a review of the literature and ideas concerning legal 
adaptation have commonalities that suggest an approach to adapting 
legal regimes, aside from the natural resources context, the legal 
literature provides little in the way of “how to” proposals. 
Professor Robin Craig has put forward five principles to approach 
climate change adaptation for natural resources. Specifically in her calls 
for monitoring, resiliency, and coordination (principles 1, 2, and 3), she 
echoes the appeals for increasing both resiliency and adaptive 
management.95 Her call for “principled” flexibility in resource 
management goals is comparable to a focus on original goals.96 While 
these goals may be impossible to meet, they should not be abandoned 
willy-nilly. 
In the field of disaster planning, which also relies on planning for 
uncertainty and which requires resiliency, Professor Robert Verchick 
has proposed that changes in law to prepare for disaster should 
reference and be consistent with what he calls the three lessons from 
environmental law: “Go Green; Be Fair; and Keep Safe.”97 Verchick 
describes “going green” as using natural systems as much as possible to 
avoid disaster, “being fair” as ensuring that no single group of people 
bears a disproportionate share of the burdens of preparation, and 
“keeping safe” as requiring the consideration of all risks associated with 
disaster in decisionmaking, not just the traditional values upon which 
agencies may rely.98 
The Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) has proposed these 
references as appropriate for guiding climate change adaptation in its 
analysis of Adaptation for the Puget Sound Region.99 It enhances the 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Doremus, supra note 80, at 46, 50, 84. 
 95. Craig, supra note 4, at 40, 43, 53. 
 96. Id. at 63. 
 97. ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A 
POST-KATRINA WORLD 3–4 (2010). 
 98. Id.  
 99. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND THE PUGET SOUND: BUILDING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADAPTATION 4 (2011), available 
at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Puget_Sound_Adaptation_1108.pdf. 
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“keep safe” lesson to emphasize the precautionary principle, arguing 
that the unavailability of information should suggest that policymakers 
take the more cautious approach.100 
In his writing on the precautionary principle, Professor Doug Kysar 
recognizes that caution is particularly important with respect to 
approaching situations with lack of—or discontinuous—information.101 
Care is necessary not only because of the inability to understand risk, 
but also because of his assertion that cost–benefit analyses will 
systematically undervalue risk in such a situation, requiring a strong 
buffer in the form of the precautionary principle to balance the 
problem.102 Professor Kysar’s theory is consistent with Professor David 
Dana’s assertion that because humans give more credence to immediate 
costs and benefits, the precautionary principle can serve as a balancing 
point for avoiding catastrophic environmental harm.103 
The reference points identified by Professor Verchick in his Facing 
Catastrophe book and adopted by CPR as appropriate for guiding 
climate change adaptation are certainly consistent with and suggested 
by the literature on adapting legal regimes. In particular, the focus on 
“going green” and “keeping safe” both reflect a conservative approach 
to systems alterations, an approach which respects the natural 
background. Professor Doremus’s approach to resource adaptation also 
favors reference to the “natural system,” even if it is a climate-changing 
natural system.104 
These approaches are consistent with a requirement of respecting the 
original goals of laws wherever possible. In particular, because our 
resource goals tend to focus on the retention of the “natural” system or 
background, and it is resource changes that will alter the physical 
backdrop for human systems, a call to maintain the physical system 
wherever possible is also a call to retain the status quo in the form of 
original goals wherever possible. 
The “being fair” principle is consistent with calls in adaptation 
literature regarding the importance of public participation at the local 
level in the consideration of any legal alterations in the face of climate 
change.105 Citizen participation at this level is one way to ensure that all 
parties have voices in the discussion and that disenfranchised groups are 
not shut out or disadvantaged by changes that may occur.106 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Id. 
 101. Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs, 22 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 7, 12 (2006). 
 102. Id. at 6, 12. 
 103. David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1325 & n.32 (2003). 
 104. Doremus, supra note 80, at 75, 77. 
 105. See BRUNNER & LYNCH, supra note 58, at 244. 
 106. Id. at 245. 
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C.  Template for Legal Adaptation 
How then can we use these ideas to create a template to approach the 
question of legal adaptation systematically? In addressing how legal 
regimes should be altered in the face of climate change, a template must 
answer the questions of how and why, and in particular, it must address 
why a specific approach to adaptation makes sense normatively. 
In terms of “how,” based on prior literature and analysis, this Essay 
proposes the following normative matrix for reviewing and proposing 
alterations to legal regimes due to climate change. Decisions on altering 
an existing legal regime should first identify which parts of the current 
regime will be stress points in a changed future, and how legal and 
policy alterations can address those stress points while preserving the 
original purposes of the regime and considering both distributive justice 
and efficiency. 
While the need for general efficiency may seem self-evident, why 
should we hew to prior identified legislative purposes? Why should we 
consider distributive and justice effects? 
A focus on previously identified legislative purposes is consistent 
with the literature on the importance of policy goals in adaptation. The 
fact that the literature’s focus on the goals is not greatly fleshed out is 
consistent with the very important concept of deliberative governance—
that policies are best made in an open debate with values tradeoffs. 
Practically speaking, this concept means that agencies can and should 
work within their statutory mandates where possible. But when facts on 
the ground make this impossible or, for political accountability reasons, 
unlikely, the legislative process must be involved. 
In several recent publications and discussions of climate change 
adaptation, the importance of legislative purpose is often ignored or 
forgotten. Many proposals jump to a solution that requires an 
administrative agency or expert body to determine the best way to go 
forward under the changed circumstances wrought by climate.107 But 
what guides decisionmaking? Untethered from any agreed-upon goal, 
new policy lies in the hands of a few, anathema to the tradeoffs that 
should be considered in such important decisions. As posed by 
environmental law attorney Matthew Zinn, “[E]ven if a cadre of 
‘ecological mandarins’ could be assembled to comprehensively assess 
and compare the impacts of competing adaptations in developing a 
coordinated adaptation plan, how would they balance the diverse 
impacts of competing adaptations?”108 
                                                                                                                     
 107. See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 20, at 1164 (discussing the Interagency Climate 
Change Task Force); VERCHICK, supra note 97, at 3. 
 108. Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a Warmer 
World, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 61, 85 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
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This may be the particular concern underlying Brunner and Lynch’s 
emphasis on the necessity of local-level decisionmaking. Experts at a 
national level may not understand or give effect to the intensely local 
concerns wrought by climate change. Without investment in a 
deliberative process, people may not support federal adaptation 
policies.109 This suggests that any major change in policy must be 
subject to some rigorous discussion of tradeoffs by the body politic.110 
Such discussion would also help to protect vulnerable groups in the 
decisionmaking process. 
Thus, until public debate occurs, it is important to give effect to what 
has come from such a system before, as current goals and policies 
generally have been adopted through the considered democratic 
process.111 It is true that because legislation applicable to a subject may 
be passed at different times, with different goals, and with different 
breadth, Congress itself may not be fully aware of prior legislation. But 
this fact does not defeat the principle of deliberating at this level. The 
very notion of the nondelegation doctrine is based on the principle that 
agencies may act only within major policy bounds decided by 
Congress.112 In his concurrence in the well-known Benzene case,113 
then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist noted that allowing 
policymaking in the Executive Branch deprived the public of its role in 
a republican form of government.114 As one court has stated, “The 
constitutional doctrine prohibiting delegation of legislative power rests 
on the premise that the Legislature may not abdicate its responsibility to 
resolve the ‘truly fundamental issues’ by delegating that function to 
others or by failing to provide adequate directions for the 
implementation of its declared policies.”115 If an existing legal regime 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See BRUNNER & LYNCH, supra note 58, at 245. 
 110. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural 
Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 254–55 (2010). See generally 
Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 265, 
271–72 (2009) (discussing how questions of plan uncertainty are frequently addressed on “an ad 
hoc basis” with “little transparency”; these plans often involve low odds for success and 
generally lead to an impediment to public participation, increased vulnerability to biases, and 
regulatory dysfunction). 
 111. This proposition, of course, is the subject of intense theory and scholarship discussing 
whether legislation well represents the public interest. For a general discussion of public choice 
theory and legislation, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 64 
(1991). 
 112. Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: 
A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New 
York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 270–71, 281 (2001). 
 113. Indus. Union Dep’t AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 
607 (1980). 
 114. Id. at 672–73 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 115. CEEED v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329 (Cal. Ct. 
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contains the flexibility to accommodate policy purposes through 
administrative changes without statutory intervention, this approach 
would be preferable to statutory alteration in the face of climate change. 
It is also conceivable that prior policy goals cannot be maintained if 
the physical world is or will be so changed that existing goals simply 
cannot be met—think of the analogous situation of changed 
circumstances related to bequests. In these cases, one can apply a 
variation that meets most or some original policy goals. But it is also 
possible that the original project purposes or goals should be completely 
reexamined, opening up other possible factors for consideration. In such 
a case, the use of the deliberative legislative process—which gives 
legitimacy to the laws in the first place—suggests that any new goals or 
goal alterations should be achieved through the same means.116 
The need to consider distributive and justice issues in adapting legal 
regimes is similarly foundational. Human-induced climate change often 
creates externalities that alter allocation of resources, and adapting to 
climate change can also increase burdens on the less economically or 
politically powerful.117 The protection of entitlements is one basic 
principle of the common law.118 The significance and weight of 
entitlement protections necessarily implies that for any kind of legal 
change in interpretation or administration, particular attention must be 
paid to the allocation of rights and how externalities may operate to 
                                                                                                                     
App. 1974) (quoting Kugler v. Yocum, 445 P.2d 303, 306 (Cal. 1968)); see also Benjamin M. 
McGovern, Reexamining the Massachusetts Nondelegation Doctrine: Is the “Areas of Critical 
Environmental Concern” Program an Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Authority?, 31 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 103, 108 (2004) (quoting Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 
913, 920–21 (Fla. 1978)). 
 116. At this point, the reader may now throw her hands up and declare this impossible. In 
the summer of 2011, reasoned political deliberation is perceived as being at an all-time low. 
Moreover, those who believe in the important principles underlying current environmental laws 
may be justifiably afraid of a legislative sabotage by anti-environmental interests, which are 
currently quite vocal. 
The significance of this problem cannot be overstated, but it is not one I will address at 
length here. I will assert that sooner or later, our environmental goals of the 1960s and 1970s 
must be reexamined in light of our changing world, and resistance to this inevitable process may 
be one reason for a backlash. It will be difficult. As Professor Richard Lazarus has stated, 
“[E]nvironmental protection laws . . . impose substantial costs on some and confer substantial 
benefits on others.” Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in 
Environmental Law, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE 
PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 369 (Jim Chen ed., 2003). 
I find some comfort in Professor Doremus’ assertion that Americans basically support 
“environmental protection as a worthy goal.” Doremus, supra note 80, at 46. However, we will 
have to revisit that importance and be prepared to justify the need for environmental protections.  
 117. Michael Vandenbergh & Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate Change: The Equity Problem, 
26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 56–57 (2008). 
 118. See Victor B. Flatt, This Land Is Your Land (Our Right to the Environment), 107 W. 
VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004). 
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obliterate such rights.119 
Indeed, many environmental law statutes can be seen as addressing 
this rights-based perspective in the absence of effective common law 
responses.120 Thus, in considering adaptation of laws, justice and 
allocation must be primary issues because any legal adaptation solution 
will likely affect distribution of resources, either by failing to 
adequately compensate for the distributive alterations from climate 
change or possibly by exacerbating them through new externalities. 
Professor Ruhl has highlighted the distributive justice concerns of 
adaptation policy at the international level, noting: 
Just as climate change impacts will be felt unevenly across 
the globe, so too is the capacity to adapt unevenly 
distributed. In both cases, unfortunately, it is the least 
developed countries that drew the short straw—they will 
feel climate change more severely and have the least 
capacity to reduce vulnerability and boost resilience.121 
However, he also notes that “a domestic version of the human rights 
dimension of adaptation policy is likely to emerge,”122 with low-income 
communities more vulnerable and less able to implement effective 
adaptive measures.123 He notes that a movement to ensure the equitable 
application of adaptation policy would not necessarily strive to protect a 
right to environmental quality, “but rather a right to equitable 
distribution of the benefits of climate change adaptation, which may or 
may not align with environmentalist norms of minimum conditions of 
environmental quality.”124 
Similarly, other scholars have recognized that “[t]he profound 
injustices that inhere in climate change’s disproportionate effects are 
obvious,”125 and that “[t]he federal response to the climate crisis . . . has 
failed to take seriously the potentially devastating impacts of climate 
change and climate change policies on poor and of-color 
communities.”126 
Thus, a template for legal adaptation in the face of climate change 
would (1) examine where climate change puts pressure on operation of 
laws; (2) seek to alter the implementation of that law or to alter the law 
                                                                                                                     
 119. Id. at 29–30. 
 120. Id. at 20. 
 121. Ruhl, supra note 45, at 406. 
 122. Id. at 407. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 409. 
 125. Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a 
Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 187 (2008). 
 126. Id. at 170. 
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itself to hew as closely as possible to the law’s original purposes; and 
(3) make these alterations in the most efficient manner possible while 
also correcting, or at least not exacerbating, any distributive 
reallocations. Where original purposes cannot be accommodated or are 
so broad as to fail to constitute a clear legislative principle, policy 
changes should be made in the democratic forum, not by administrative 
fiat. 
IV.  APPLICATION EXAMPLES 
The CLEAR workshop on adapting legal regimes sought to utilize 
this template with legal scholars specializing in multiple areas of law 
that could be affected by climate change, including hazard response 
law, natural resources law, public health law, and local and state 
government law. Observations from the workshop provide examples of 
how the template could work in practice. 
In examining the area of hazards and hazard response law, for 
instance, the workshop scholars determined that the availability of 
adequate information about a risk is a pressure point occurring because 
of the changing climate.127 Specifically, the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP), though deficient overall, would allow for better and 
updated information without legislative changes. 
In the group examining natural resources laws, the scholars focused 
on the “multiple use” mandate, common to many resource management 
laws. In theory, such a legal mandate should be the “best” option for 
climate change adaptation because it provides a “resilient” law that can 
alter resource usage without statutory change. In practice, however, it 
has proven to be just the opposite, as agencies routinely cling to a static 
balance of uses.128 Thus, unlike other areas, original purpose—beyond 
mere flexibility—was more difficult to identify. In practice, the scholars 
noted how agencies attempt to maintain all uses in similar proportion to 
historic requirements.129 Because this purpose seems to be to maintain 
all existing uses, which may not be possible, the group focused on the 
uses that increase sustainability, preserving resources for all—including 
future generations. This solution at least blunts the reallocation harms 
                                                                                                                     
 127. See Ctr. for Law, Env’t, Adaptation & Res., Adapting Legal Regimes in the Face of 
Climate Change Workshop: Hazards Discussion Group, UNC SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.unc.edu/centers/clear/workshops/climatechange/overview/discussiongroups/haz
ards.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 128. See Ctr. for Law, Env’t, Adaptation & Res., Adapting Legal Regimes in the Face of 
Climate Change Workshop: Natural Resources Discussion Group, UNC SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.unc.edu/centers/clear/workshops/climatechange/overview/discussiongroups/res
ources.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 129. Id. 
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associated with the effects of climate change on resources.130 The 
workshop group also suggested that any changes to the “multiple use” 
mix should be legislatively addressed, as these are important policy 
decisions.131 
A different workshop group analyzed the legal sphere of public 
health.132 This group determined that almost the entire legislative 
framework of public health is inadequate to face the challenges brought 
on by climate change.133 Thus, the group identified specific ways to 
improve the entire system. In particular, this workshop group stressed 
the need for better information and better information-gathering to 
address new disease-borne vectors.134 However, because the existing 
systems neither emphasize information or information-gathering, nor 
provide flexibility for implementation, the group suggested the 
consideration of legislative changes in a democratic forum.135 
Interestingly, such changes are now being discussed at the national 
legislative level. 
A workshop group that addressed the impact of climate change with 
respect to local zoning laws believed this area of law so critical to future 
adaptation that it suggested that the legislature revisit the entire 
system—primarily because federal involvement may be necessary and 
the federal government historically has played no role in local zoning 
policy.136 
Though three of these four areas of broad legal examination 
identified so many problems that existing goals must be reconsidered, 
the template still provides an important tool in implementing adaptation 
of laws in the face of climate change. Legislative changes can take 
many forms, and an initial examination of pressure points on laws or 
groups of laws can often identify specific solutions that might improve 
the system with legislative changes. In the case of the “multiple use” 
paradigm, the examination also shows how seeming legislative 
flexibility may be insufficient if alteration is not likely to occur in 
practice because any alteration is so weighted with policy consideration. 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Ctr. for Law, Env’t, Adaptation & Res., Adapting Legal Regimes in the Face of 
Climate Change Workshop: Public Health Discussion Group, UNC SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.unc.edu/centers/clear/workshops/climatechange/overview/discussiongroups/pub
lichealth.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Ctr. for Law, Env’t, Adaptation & Res., Adapting Legal Regimes in the Face of 
Climate Change Workshop: Local and State Government Discussion Group, UNC SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.unc.edu/centers/clear/workshops/climatechange/overview/discussiongro 
ups/government.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
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Regardless of whether a legislature adopts this expert reasoning and 
analysis, it provides a focus for consideration that moves the adaptation 
solution forward. 
CONCLUSION 
The world is changing due to climate, and that change is 
accelerating. As our society depends on the natural world, all facets of 
our society face the same need to change. How we adapt to climate 
change is one of the most important questions that humanity has faced. 
Because our existing laws provide an integrated structure for managing 
our world and society, this structure is a logical place to direct 
adaptation efforts. 
In reviewing discourse on how to use the law for adaptation, we 
discern three important principles: that we need to hew to original 
purposes; that we must be aware of distributional unfairness; and that 
when original purposes are no longer possible, major policy decisions 
should be made with the input of the public in a democratic and 
efficient manner. Drawing on these principles, the proposed template 
facilitates a systematic approach to climate change adaptation through 
laws. The stress points at which climate change creates the most 
difficulty under current law and policy will become more and more 
obvious as the climate continues to change. These points can also be 
studied systematically. Once these stress points are identified, one can 
propose how the laws can be implemented to achieve their original 
purposes while also avoiding distributional injustice. In cases in which 
the original purposes cannot be met administratively, the analysis 
provides an appropriate discussion of needs and tradeoffs that a 
legislative body can then examine. When policy changes are necessary, 
the input of the public is critical. 
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